Basically Law

Read the opinion here.

Issue.  Is mental retardation a "quasi-suspect" classification for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause?

Background.  The Texas City of Cleburne denied a special use permit for the running of a group home for the mentally retarded.  Such a permit, however, is not necessary for the use of multiple dwelling facilities for others who are not mentally retarded.  Clearly, the city made a distinction based on mental retardation.

The group home sued and claimed that such a distinction violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The Court of Appeals agreed and found mental retardation to be a "quasi-suspect" class.  On appeal, the Supreme Court did not agree mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" class but did find that the City's denial of the special use permit violated equal protection under rational review analysis.

Court's Analysis.  The Court first determined whether mental retardation was a "quasi-suspect" class for equal protection purposes.  The Court found that it was not.  First, the mentally retarded run the gambit in their disability and the State has an interest in dealing appropriately with them.  Second, law makers, at all levels, have been addressing the needs of the mentally retarded through anti-discrimination laws and providing resources for their care.  Since they are being provided for through the political process, it is difficult to argue that they are an insular minority.  Third, the legislative response to the needs of the mentally disabled has shown that they are not politically powerless.  Finally, if the mentally retarded were deemed a "quasi-suspect" class, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who perhaps have immutable disabilities setting them apart from others that need "quasi-suspect" protection.

Even though mental retardation is not a "quasi-suspect" class, it does not mean that the special use permit survives Equal Protection scrutiny.  The city still needs a rational basis for distinguishing the mentally retarded in the need for a special use permit.  All the City needs to demonstrate that the distinction is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  Cleburne could not do so in this case.

Cleburne was concerned about the negative attitude of the majority of property owners who would be located within 200 feet of the group home.  Mere negative attitudes or unsubstantiated fears are not a constitutionally permissible reason to make such a distinction.  Cleburne also feared that the residents of the group home would be ridiculed by local school children.  Again, the Court found that justification to be inappropriate since it was a vague idea that children may ridicule the mentally retarded even though there were more than 40 mentally retarded students in the school.  Cleburne was also concerned that the home was located in a flood plain.  A concern for the building on a flood plain cannot explain why a group home for the mentally retarded needs a special use permit while one for the elderly, for example, does not.  Finally, Cleburne was concerned about the number of residents and the size of the home.  Again, the Court noted that Cleburne did not show such concern for other types of group homes which did not need a special use permit.

Since Cleburne could not rationally justify the distinction it made in who needed a permit to run a group home (based on the type of residents who would live in the home), the distinction was not constitutionally permissible.