U.S. v. Lopez (1995)
Wednesday, October 14, 2009 at 8:46PM Read the Opinion, here.
Issue. Does Congress have the power under the Commerce Clause to pass a criminal statute that makes it illegal to possess a firearm in a school zone?
Background. In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The Act made it illegal “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individuals knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”
On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez, a 12th Grade Student, brought a concealed handgun and five bullets into school. When school authorities confronted Lopez he admitted he had a gun. He was arrested and charged under the federal statute (after the state charges were dropped). Lopez was found guilty but appealed and contended that Congress did not have the authority under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution to criminalize possession of a handgun in a school zone. The Government countered that it had the power to pass such a law under the Commerce Clause.
Lower courts agreed with Lopez and the Government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the criminal statute exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and struck down the law as unconstitutional.
Court’s Analysis. The Court examined the history of how the Commerce Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. Even though the Court has relaxed Congress’s powers to legislate under the Commerce Clause, its power is not infinite. There are three areas where Congress can legislate to regulate interstate commerce: 1.) Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 2.) Congress may regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may only come from intrastate activity; and 3.) Congress may regulate those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
The criminal statute at hand does not fall under the first two categories. Therefore, the Court needed to determine whether the law was an appropriate measure to regulate activity that affects interstate commerce. The Government argued that possession of a firearm near a school substantially affects interstate commerce in three ways: 1.) the cost of crime is substantial and is spread throughout the population; 2.) violent crimes reduce the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe; and 3.) the presence of guns in school zones poses a substantial threat to the education process which will lead to less productive citizens which would have an adverse affect on the Nation’s economic well-being.
The first two justifications were easily dismissed. Those arguments would result in the federalization of criminal law as any criminal statute could be justified on those grounds as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. As for the third argument, if Congress could pass any law related to “national productivity”, Congress’s powers to legislate has no bounds as it could regulate in almost any aspect of human activity, including family law. The Government’s justifications would make it hard pressed for the Federal Government not to legislate in every area of law, rendering Article I, Section 9 meaningless.
Even though the Court had difficulty in defining the exact parameters when a law would pass constitutional scrutiny under the commerce clause, the Court notes:
The possession of a gun in a local school is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. [Lopez] was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
To uphold the Government’s contention here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Ultimately, the Court could not accept the Government’s justification for the law.
My Analysis. Lest you think that this case redefined Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, think again. Congress amended the law to make Prosecutors prove that the gun in possession actually travelled in the channels of interstate commerce (a very easy thing to prove) and the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal on the constitutionality of the revised statute.
Either the old or the new statute, I believe it goes beyond Congress’s powers to regulate interstate commerce. First and foremost, the regulation must involve economic activity. Possession of a weapon is not economic activity. Now, a sale of a gun in a school zone is a different matter. I know it sounds like splitting hairs, but it is an important distinction, especially when the Constitution is involved.
Further, and this is Rehnquist’s concern – the law is just further federalization of criminal law. This was definitely not envisioned by our Founders when they drafted the Constitution.